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Anti-money laundering policy:  
A response to the activity of criminals  
or of agencies?
Jackie Harvey and Simon Ashton1
Introduction
Compliance by financial insitutions for the purposes of anti-money laundering 
was introduced by the 1993 Money Laundering Regulations.2 This was only 
seven years after the the first prescribed system of regulation had been brought to 
bear upon financial markets in the UK in the shape of the1986 Financial Services 
Act. These markets had, prior to that point been largely left to their own devices, 
observing Uberrimae Fidea.3 Indeed it can be argued that it was this 1986 Act 
that gave birth to the construct of compliance that is at the heart of the British 
model of regulation. It is fair to observe that the ensuing relationship between 
the financial markets and their regulators has proved to be somewhat complex 
and far from easy, described as “a constant battle of wits between the surveyors and the 
surveyed – a battle where rituals of verification abound, where enormous energy goes into 
those rituals and into their subversion” (Moran, 2000, p 11). 
 The 1986 Act created the mechanism for formal self-governance but it was 
two subsequent parliamentary Acts that provided the shift of power in favour 
of the regulators, the first of these was the Financial Service and Markets Act, 
2000, an Act that saw the introduction of a model of statutory regulation.4 
The 2000 Act provided the regulator with an extensive range of disciplinary, 
criminal and civil powers to use against regulated firms and individuals. 
1 The authors are respectively Professor of Financial Management and Master’s student 
at Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University, UK.
 Recognition is also given to Mr Rowan Bosworth-Davies who had provided prior 
research support, some of which has featured in this paper.
2 The Money Laundering Regulations, 1993 (statutory Instrument No. 1933 effective 
1st April, 1994)
3 Literally translated as ‘my word is my bond’.
4 This Act effectively combined the self regulatory bodies that previously governed each part 
of the financial market into a single regulator – the Financial Services Authority (FSA).
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These powers were subsequently further tightened by the Financial Services 
Act, 2012. The various incarnations of the financial markets regulatory body 
has tended to be achieved simply by rearrangement much like deckchairs 
being moved on the beach to track the sun’s rays. The 2012 Act dismantled 
the single regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) which had come 
under increasing criticism that its span of oversight and control had grown 
too large to be effective. It was replaced with two regulators; the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA). 
In addition, the 2012 Act broadened and strengthened the law in relation to 
market manipulation (arising from the LIBOR fixing ‘scandal’)5 in order to 
improve accountability within the industry.
 The relationship between regulatory bodies and the regulated sector was 
made more complex through the introduction of the anti-money laundering 
legislative framework (AML). The role of compliance as originally envisaged by 
the 1986 Act was very much one of internal focus, ensuring that the individual 
traders kept on the right side of the law and that their employing financial 
institutions did not step out of line and attract the opprobrium of the regulator. 
AML, however, introduced a new dimension to this compliance task. Not only 
did compliance officers have to ensure that the activities of their organisations 
did not themselves constitute aiding and abetting money laundering but 
they acquired the additional task of protecting their firms from becoming 
unintentionally embroiled in potentially illegal activity perpetrated by their 
clients. Thus, it placed upon them an additional external policing role in which 
they would have to monitor and report upon the activities of their customers. 
The regulatory relationship therefore acquired a new dimension which brought 
about interaction with law enforcement and the agencies of the police.6
 The narrative within this chapter is built around the twin agencies of 
the FSA and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and their role 
in AML, recognising that both agencies now exist in a different form.7 Thus 
5 Forex scandal: What it that all about? BBC Business news, 12th June, 2014 available at: 
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26526905 (accessed 20/7/14)
6 A further change in anti-money laundering legislation is anticipated in response 
to the pending EU 4th Money Laundering Directive (the proposal for which was 
published in February, 2013). Following completion of the third round of mutual 
evaluation reports, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has modified their 40 
Recommendations launching the 2012 version in February 2013. The EU’s 4th 
Directive will reflect the updated Recommendations.
7 As noted the 2012 Financial Services Act created the FCA and PRA; whilst SOCA 
was dismantled as a result of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and was replaced by the 
National Crime Agency (NCA).
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we consider the ‘matrimonial’ relationship between the regulators and the 
regulated entity that is internal to the financial markets. We further consider 
how both relate to the police enforcement agency, an agency that is external 
to the financial markets and in our metaphor is the silent jealous lover. 
It is the external enforcement agency that we suggest to be the ultimate 
beneficiary of the outcome of their joint compliance effort. This is played 
out through the regulatory ‘rituals’ that define the terms of engagement for 
the different sides, where each knows the rules, how they should be adhered 
to and both benefit from their continued existence; tending towards a mutual 
support for the status quo. Indeed, their relationship can be viewed as that of a 
married couple where the initial ardour has long since departed but they stay 
together in mutual tolerance because their history is jointly constructed and 
co-dependent such that one could no longer envisage life without the other.
 It considers evidence from a range of material taken from public sources 
and uses for illustration, previously unpublished data that has been collected 
from three semi structured interviews that were conducted in June and 
July 2009 with Money Laundering Reporting Officers (MLROs) based 
respectively, in a financial institution, a firm of accountants and from within 
the gaming industry. These were selected as representative of the range of 
professions that fall within the AML regulatory framework.
Background: overview of the UK legal framework 
As can be seen from Table 1, the legal framework for money laundering within 
the UK is contained within a range of primary legislation, related regulations 
and guidance notes. However, the key pieces of legislation are the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 2002 (POCA), in particular Sections 327 to 329, as amended by 
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOPCA) and the Serious 
Crime Act, 2007. The 2002 Act simplified the pre-existing law by replacing 
the parallel drug (Drug Trafficking Act 1994) and non-drug money laundering 
offences (Criminal Justice Act 1988 as amended) with single offences. In 
addition to confiscation of assets it included provision for civil recovery. It 
also required (enforced by criminal liability) compliance by the regulated 
sector with the principal requirements to monitor customers (KYC) and to 
report suspicious activity (SARs). The legal framework has been translated into 
financial industry rules and codes (through the regulator) and subsequently 
into detailed (and lengthy) industry guidance and interpretational notes.
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Table 1
The relationship between international, national law, regulation and 
guidance
Intergovernmental 
standards
Financial Action Task Force, 
40 Recommendations 1990, 1996, 2003 and 2012
EU Money 
laundering 
Directives
Money laundering Directives: 1st Directive (1991) implemented in UK 
in 1993; 
2nd Directive (2001) implemented in the UK in 2001
3rd Directive (2005) implemented in the UK in 2007
UK Primary 
legislation
1993 Criminal Justice Act as amended by the 1996 Criminal Justice 
Act 
1994 Drug Trafficking Act
1995 Proceeds of Crime Act
2000 Terrorism Act as amended by the 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act
2002 Proceeds of Crime Act (combines and simplifies the 1996 
Criminal Justice Act and the 1994 Drug Trafficking Act) as amended 
by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 and the Serious 
Crime Act 2007
UK Secondary 
legislation
1993 Money Laundering Regulations
2001 Money Laundering Regulations
2007 Money Laundering Regulations 
International 
regulatory standards
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
1988 “Prevention of Criminal use of the banking System for the 
Purpose of Money Laundering”
2001 “Customer Due Diligence for Banks”
2014 “Sound Management of Risks Related to Money Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism”
UK Regulation 2001 FSA Handbook 
2011 FSA Financial Crime: a Guide for Firms (PS11/15)
2013 FCA Financial Crime: a Guide for Firms Part 2: Financial Crime 
Thematic Review
2014 FCA Financial Crime: a Guide for Firms Part 1: A Firm’s Guide 
to Preventing Financial Crime
Industry guidance Joint Money Laundering Steering Group (JMLSG) guidance notes 
“Prevention of Money Laundering/Combatting Terrorist Financing 
2006 (parts 1 and 2)
2007 (parts 1 and 2)
2009 (parts 1 and 2)
2010 (part 3)
2011 (Part 1- Guidance for the UK Financial Sector; Part 2 Sectoral 
Guidance; Part 3 Specialist Guidance
The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private 
Banking 2000, revised in 2002 and the current version is 2012. 
BBA ‘money laundering Officer’s Practical Handbook; annual 
publication
Source: compiled by the authors
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Initial ardour: rituals and relationships
Vass (2006, pp. 191-192) discusses how “the development of codification as 
institutionalisation” is embedded within the regulatory framework. This takes 
place within two dimensions: Firstly, regulation becomes subject to judgement 
with academics drawing attention to the need for accountability and fairness 
(often referred to as transparency), proportionality to the problem; targeting 
to avoid unintended consequences; and consistency to avoid uncertainty 
(Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p.77; Kirkpatrick, 2006, p 236). Secondly, the 
regulators themselves are open to external scrutiny as retention of public 
interest as the dominant paradigm requires that they do not fall prey to 
regulatory capture.8 Thus Vass (2006) further deconstructs accountability into 
three components: (a) being able to provide reasons for decisions, (b) to make 
them available for scrutiny and (c) to submit (if required) to independent 
review. 
 Beyond the legal structure, agencies of government will be created in 
order to enforce and ensure compliance with the legislation. Once created, 
such agencies will somewhat rationally seek to ensure their own survival 
and longevity. Thus reality and the behavioural interactions between policy 
making actors clashes headlong with this rational process, as Vass described 
above. 
 In this tension there is much organisational social-psychology, as can be 
deduced from the courtship between the regulator and the regulated sector: 
while each reveals its own desires, it carefully gauges the response of the 
other. If one accepts that the AML framework is here for the long term, both 
sides have to adhere to their respective roles and responsibilities such that 
the regulator can be seen to be proportional, objective and reasonable. For 
its part, the regulated entities have to balance their desire to be compliant 
against the interests of their shareholders.
 This courtship dance can be illustrated by the move from a rules-based to a 
risk-based approach to AML promulgated by the FSA. Companies governed 
by the regulations are required to obtain information about the nature and 
purpose of the business relationship that they will be entering with the 
customer. This is to be carried out at the commencement of the business 
relationship, and at other appropriate times during the relationship on the 
basis of their risk estimation, something that is referred to as being on a ‘risk-
8 Capture theory is attributed to George Stigler (1971) and describes a state whereby 
regulators rather than acting in the public interest gain benefit from promoting the 
interests of those they profess to regulate.
Jackie Harvey and Simon Ashton
288
sensitive basis’. In its consultation paper, DP22 “Reducing money laundering 
risk: know your customer and AML monitoring”, the FSA discussed the practical 
application of the then proposed risk based approach to AML, noting that 
without its adoption “firms’ costs will be disproportionate” (section 2.6, p 7). Thus 
suggesting that its implementation was in response to cost pressures within 
the institutions. This risk-based model requires regulation by exception – 
trusting that organisations self-police leaving the regulator to concentrate 
resource and effort in areas of high risk. The important point here and one 
that sometimes is a point of contention, is that the ‘relevant person’ must 
be able to demonstrate to his supervisory authority that the extent of the 
measures in place is appropriate in view of the risks of money laundering 
and terrorist financing. The purpose behind this risk-based approach was to 
enable banks in particular, to tailor their scrutiny and AML efforts in a more 
cost effective manner and help, therefore, reduce the costs of compliance. The 
problem that arose from implementing this approach is that the institutions 
felt that they still needed clarity and direction from the regulators which 
for their part were trying to divest some of the decision making falling 
to them under the previous ‘rule-based’ approach. But by being reasonable 
and proportionate did the regulators really intend to slacken the reins? The 
negative answer to this question is complicated by the coincidence with the 
recent pursuit of a policy of visible deterrence that has witnessed a gradual 
increase in the overall size of regulatory fines levied on transgressors. This 
visibility, far from slackening the reins, is probably also resulting from the 
financial crisis that has, inevitably, led to calls for what Moshella and Tsingou 
(2013, p. 409) refered to as “re-regulation” of these markets and “to a more 
assertive and interventionist role for the public sector”, with perceived failings 
of the system resulting in further regulatory constraint (and power for the 
regulator). Moran’s ‘constant battle’ in our regulatory courtship sets the scene 
whereby the regulated entity aims to demonstrate compliance (at minimum 
cost) and the regulatory agencies seek to maximise status, resources and 
enforcement tools.Thus we see a proliferation of interpretational guidance 
of what were originally quite simple principles. This guidenace tends to 
expand with each iteration of the rules as illustrated by Table 2. It can be seen 
that the original 1988 guidance from the BIS was just four pages in length, 
this becomes 170 plus pages in the guidance notes from the Joint Money 
Laundering Steering Group.
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Table 2
Size of documents by source and date order
Document Author Number of Pages
Prevention of Criminal use of the Banking 
System for the Purpose of Money-
Laundering (December 1988)
Bank for International 
Settlements
4 pages
Customer due diligence for banks (October 
2001)
Bank for International 
Settlements
17 pages (21 
including 
appendices)
Sound Management of Risk Related to 
Money Laundering and Financing of 
Terrorism (January 2014)
Bank for International 
Settlements
29 pages
Handbook (release 001) December 2001 
section on Money Laundering
Financial Services Authority 29 pages
DP22 “Reducing money laundering risk: 
know your customer and AML monitoring” 
2003
Financial Services Authority 26 pages (54 
pages including 
appendices)
“Financial Crime: a Guide for Firms” 
PS11/15 December 2011 Chapter 3 Money 
Laundering
Financial Services Authority 15 pages
“Financial Crime: a guide for firms: part 1 - 
a firm’s guide to preventing financial crime” 
April 2014 Chapter 3 Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing
Financial Conduct 
Authority
15 pages
Guidance notes for the financial sector 
on the prevention of money laundering/
combating terrorist financing January 2006 
Part 1
Joint Money Laundering 
Steering Group
153 pages
Guidance notes for the financial sector 
on the prevention of money laundering/
combating terrorist financing December 
2007 Part 1
Joint Money Laundering 
Steering Group
159 pages
Guidance notes for the financial sector 
on the prevention of money laundering/
combating terrorist financing November 
2009 Part 1
Joint Money Laundering 
Steering Group
175 pages
Guidance notes for the financial sector 
on the prevention of money laundering/
combating terrorist financing December 
2011 Part 1
Joint Money Laundering 
Steering Group
174 pages
Forty Recommendations 1990 Financial Action Task Force 6 pages
Forty Recommendations 1996 Financial Action Task Force 13 pages
Forty Recommendations 2003 Financial Action Task Force 27 pages
Forty Recommendations 2012 Financial Action Task Force 124 pages 
Source: compiled by the authors
Jackie Harvey and Simon Ashton
290
It was earlier pointed out that one of the principles of regulation is to ensure 
that regulators are open to external scrutiny to avoid regulatory capture. The 
desire to operate in their own best interest rather than in the interest of those 
that they served led Stigler (1971) to conclude in terms of ‘capture theory’ 
that “the regulated system comes to be operated in the interest of the regulated firms 
rather than the more general public interest” (Ricketts, 2006, p. 38)9.
 It may be constructed that ‘capture’ explains how once created, agencies 
seek to influence the state of affairs to perpetuate the need for their continued 
existence and this might reasonably explain this proliferation of guidance 
and explanation. Whilst we contemplate the content of Table 2 (and Figure 
1 below) it is worth noting that the original 40 Recommendations from the 
FATF covered a mere six pages whilst the revised version runs to 124 pages 
with 20 pages for the Recommendations and 75 pages supplying ‘interpretive 
notes’.
Figure 1: FATF Plenary in session February, 2012
Source : http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/
9 Capture theory can be seen as a component of bureaucracy theory (attributed to 
Max Weber) as it highlights one of the problems that arises within such as system.
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Wooing: agency justification and the moral 
imperative
In so far as we have agency creation there is a need for justification and in 
the context of AML the dominant discourse narrative is woven around the 
‘problem’ of money laundering by ensuring that rather than decreasing as 
a result of and in response to increasing rounds of legislative intervention, 
the problem simply continues to grow. The imagery of fear around the 
threat of money laundering is reflected in the expansion of the global AML 
framework from its initial focus on drugs to a wide range of other areas 
of criminal activity (refer for example to the United Nations conventions: 
Vienna, 1988; Palermo, 2000; and Merida, 2003) making it far more difficult 
to reverse (Alldridge, 2008). Alldridge further notes the endorsement 
to the international imperative through the involvement of the IMF and 
IBRD to “add both gravitas and the appearance of impartiality” to the debate (p. 
439). Sharman (2008) draws attention to the ‘rational fiction’ of the AML 
framework, spread not because of unassailable effectiveness, but to signal 
membership of ‘the group’. Add to this the observed broadening of the 
definition of what actually constitutes money laundering (van Duyne, 2003 
and Alldridge, 2008) and the problem inevitably becomes bigger, attracting 
greater public attention (and presumably disquiet) and the apparently rational 
requirement for additional resources with which to counter this threat.10 
 The more we move from reality, the subject of objective assessment, 
towards a fiction that is interpreted by perception, we move into areas that 
cannot be rationally challenged. As such we witness a rather creative ex post 
rationalisation of actions through construction of validating behavioural 
‘norms’ underpinned through what van Duyne and vander Beken (2009) 
describe as a restructuring of the facts that collectively achieve a ‘re-framing’ 
of reality. As eloquently argued by van Duyne and vander Beken (2009) 
objectivity in assessment becomes waylaid by emotion in any discussion of 
criminal activity and the tenor consistently evokes images of threat. This 
becomes an example of what Jolls et al. (1998, p. 1518) term “pollutant of 
the month” syndrome where regulation is driven by recent and memorable 
instances of harm. Thus “when beliefs and presences are produced by a set of 
probability judgements, made inaccurate by the availability heuristic11, legislation 
10 Made all the more urgent by the threat posed by terrorism and its financing.
11 The availability heuristic explains ease of availability of information recall in the brain: 
negative events that are easy to remember are accorded a greater perceived frequency 
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will predictably become anecdote driven” (ibid). Sunstein (2002) argued that 
‘emphasised’ stories related to a crime will trigger this availability heuristic, 
which in turn is responsible for skewing perceptions of what is considered 
normal and further when “intense emotions” are engaged, people tend to focus 
on the adverse outcome rather than its plausible likelihood. 
 Drawing on these ideas, the availability of such a threat will be 
determined by perceived frequency and resonance in addition to its recency. 
Thus if something has occurred recently, perception of it occurring again is 
attached a higher probability. In addition, perception is open to manipulation 
according to how information is presented. When a threat becomes ‘available’ 
(however unrealistic) there will be an associated demand for action on the 
part of policy makers. For as noted by Dorn (2009, p. 2) although “righteous 
indignation may drive ‘quick fix’ policy activity, it does not facilitate a reasoned public 
debate of policy alternatives”. Indeed, Combs and Slovic (1979) identified a high 
correlation between availability biases and the amount of media coverage an 
event received. Agencies are able to exploit ‘availability’; thus it is possible for 
them to influence government legislation through employment of the threat 
rhetoric, employing media coverage and heightening awareness such that a 
legislative response is automatic and ‘justified’. Harvey (2014, p. 187) points 
to “the ability to create evidence of overwhelming importance of function” leading to 
a system that is self-reinforcing. Agency justification from the perspective of 
law enforcement is premised upon the ‘threat’ to the integrity of the financial 
system posed by criminal contamination. Indeed, Woodiwiss and Hobbs 
(2009, p. 124) quoting Garland (2001, p. 17912) state that institutions: “have a 
way of taking on a life of their own, and outliving the meanings and motivations that 
led to them being set up in the first place . . . continuing long after the original reasons 
for their creation have faded”.
 This relationship between the media and the Government was identified 
by Wilkins (1964) in what he terms the “deviancy amplification spiral” (see 
below). The manner of how such issues are presented to society has been 
noted as an important factor in how perceptions are manipulated, Stallings 
(1990), notes that written media publications play a crucial role in this process. 
Similarly, Cohen (2004, p. 66) explains how the media can engage these intense 
emotions and create moral panic (a term attributed to him arising from his 
work in the 1970s in relation to British teenage gangs) which involves:
and thus risk. This ease of recall can be influenced by heavy media coverage where 
such items are overstated as risk. 
12 Garland, D., (ed.) Mass Imprisonment: Social Causes and Consequences, London, Sage, 
2001 .
Anti-money laundering policy: A response to the activity of criminals or of agencies?  
293
 “A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerging to become 
defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented 
in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral 
barricades are manned by editors, politicians and other right-thinking 
people . . .”
Figure 2
Example Deviancy Amplification ‘Spiral’
Source: Adapted from Wilkins 1964
Problem perception by the general public can be influenced by the 
activities of ‘claim-makers’ examples of whom are cited as government, law 
enforcement agencies and media, amongst others (Fishman, 1980). Similarly, 
Nichols (1997) argued that ‘landmark’ cases were used by ‘claim-makers’ to 
heighten perception of the crime of money laundering within the United 
States. Framing information in a negative way can also be achieved by context 
and structure of the words themselves (Jewkes, 2004). Take the following 
examples in relation to a discussion of information about asset recovery. The 
first extract is from a document published by the Home Office reporting on 
work undertaken by Dubourg and Prichard13 in both 2005 and 2007:
13 Dubourg, R. and Prichard, S. (Eds) (2008) Organised crime: revenues, economic and social 
costs, and criminal assets available for seizure. Home Office available at: 
 http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/freedom-of-information/released-
information1/foi-archive-crime/9886.pdf?view=Binary
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Dubourg and Prichard (2008, p. 57) estimate “the value of additional 
criminal assets theoretically [emphasis added] available for seizure is about 
£2bn per year in the UK, with more than £3bn of revenue sent overseas 
annually”. The authors go on to note “Given the lack of reliable data, 
many of the underlying assumptions are speculative and some calculations 
are unfortunately reliant on judgements rather than hard evidence” . . . 
and . . . “provided these estimates are not treated as established facts,”
Sadly, too often the original caveats of the authors are disassociated from 
subsequent repetition of the ‘facts’. Is it coincidental that the derived values 
are curiously similar to those reported by HM Treasury (2007, p. 2914) 
which “suggested that organised crime domestically generates over £2 billion of 
assets in seizable form annually, while a further £3 billion is likely to be sent 
overseas”. Of greater concern is that this figure is derived from the following 
simple arithmetic (with no caveats attached: a sizeable sample of the 200.000 
SARs indicated a median value of £10.000 and a mean of £35.000. 
Assumed 40% ‘suspicious’ thus revealing £2-3 billion of laundered funds 
(35.000*200.000*40%).15 This is reminiscent of the FATF 1990 estimation 
(see van Duyne, 1994). Similarly, Harvey (2014, p. 201-202) notes: 
“While there are clear gaps in the knowledge of the current academic 
literature by virtue of lack of access, it is suggested that the amounts 
available for recovery are less than accurate, skewing performance 
expectations placed upon those tasked with its recovery.”
Thus issues become matters of public concern with crimes such as money 
laundering being treated by the media as ‘infotainment’ (Levi, 2001). As 
illustrated in the web site of the former SOCA and the current NCA, use is 
made of imagery to exploit the righteous indignation of the hard working 
majority that criminals are able to achieve the trappings of the good life 
through crime, justifying their crusading ‘tough on crime’ mantra that goes 
back to the early years of the Blair government.16
14 HM Treasury, (2007) “The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism” available at 
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk
15  Information extracted from p. 28 of the 2007 report. 
16 Refer to the Labour Party Manifesto 1997 that promised to be “tough on crime and 
tough on the causes of crime”. 
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Figure 3 
Images and narrative from the Crime Agency
SOCA Annual Report 2008/9*
‘Some of the assets seized from Mark McKinney’
Extract from the SOCA website from 2012 available from
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120405020725/http://www.soca.gov.uk/
about-soca/how-we-work/asset-recovery
“SOCA is determined to ensure that criminals can’t enjoy their profits. We also want to 
reduce the damage they cause by getting in between them and their working capital. The 
driving principle behind our approach is that criminals must not be allowed to hold onto 
their assets, profits and lifestyles. We will do everything we can to ensure they don’t have 
it, can’t use it, and can’t flaunt it.
In 2009/10 SOCA denied criminals access to assets worth £317.5 million. This includes 
work that has been done as a result of SOCA referrals to our partners. Since April 
2008, the assets subject to recovery and consent orders in our cases have included 205 
properties or areas of land; 37 vehicles, including cars, a plane, a helicopter, two boats, and 
a petrol tanker; 190 bank accounts; 17 financial products including pensions, investments 
and shares; 56 cash payments; and numerous other assets including paintings, licence 
plates, cattle, and jewellery.”
Taken from the rolling banner on the NCA website
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/ (accessed 12th October, 2014)
‘Yacht sailed from Caribbean carrying more than £100m worth of cocaine’
* Page 19 Serious Organised Crime Agency Annual Report 2008-9 available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100505093946/soca.gov.uk/about-
soca/library (accessed, 19th February, 2014)
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Compliance and the contribution of the regulated 
sector
Whilst compliance was always viewed as a necessary cost that would protect 
the institution from regulatory sanction arising from its own rule transgression, 
the further monitoring of the activities of its clientele for potential criminal 
conduct placed on them an additional burden of cost. Compliance will be 
accorded value within an organisation where it converges with the internal 
ethics, as “the sense of moral obligation, it turns out, is very common throughout society 
and, it appears, may be a significant motivation explaining much of the evidence on 
compliance behaviour” (Sultinen and Kuperan, 1999, p. 178). Bosworth-Davies 
(2009) has in the past argued that the general run of compliance officers 
share their employer’s free-market cultural beliefs in both the propriety and 
the priority of the commercial considerations of their industry over other 
interests; that their appointment does nothing more than simply provide 
the visible manifestation of a purely cosmetic response to legislation, and 
that they will actively resist developing attitudes or practices which would 
increase the likelihood of criminalisation of fellow industry practitioners.
 Just the regulators face a conflict in executing their dual role: they are 
charged with reducing financial crime at the same time as maintaining 
confidence in the financial system. Prosecuting financial crime inevitably 
involves exposing wrong doing within the industry which may reduce 
confidence as it is exposed into the public domain. In the same fashion and 
undoudebly creating also tension in the marital home, the conflict for the 
compliance professional is that in undertaking the policing function with 
which they are charged, they have to remain mindful of the reputation (and 
profitability) of their employer. This implies treading a thin line between 
enforcing adherence to these extended rules whilst at the same time avoiding 
disclosure of any information that would potentially damage the public 
reputation of the business. Many compliance officials come from a police 
background and perceive their role as one of fighting money laundering 
with great emphasis on the security aspect (Favarel-Garrigues, Godefroy and 
Lascoumes, 2008, pp. 10-11), engaged in protecting the bank by undertaking 
defensive reporting as observed by Demetis and Angell (2007). The extent 
that such people are attracted into the profession was observed by an MLRO 
from the accounting profession interviewed by the lead author in July 2009: 
“they might attract the sort of people who for some reason never managed to join the 
police – the detective wanabees”. 
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 Profit driven organisations are required to balance their underpinning 
commercial objectives against the resource cost requirements associated 
with this extended compliance function. More concerning from a cost 
perspective is the decision by some banks to further extend this responsibility 
by establishing their own internal police function. Take for example the 
following statement:
“One of the things we are looking at is to create a small intelligence unit 
that would make more effective use of the data we generate internally to 
try and understand whether our risk assessment methodology is helping 
us to identify the likelihood of suspicious activity. Feedback on SAR 
quality from the authorities, which is a typical industry gripe (and on 
which SOCA is working), is helpful in this process, but I have quite 
low expectations about the level of feedback we will ever see even in 
relatively well resourced places like the UK”.
It has also been suggested (Bosworth-Davies, 2009) that money laundering 
prevention does not rank highly in the ambitions of financial institutions or 
of others subject to the money laundering regulations. Willingness to comply 
for a profit driven firm and to bear the exogenous cost will be driven by fear 
of regulatory sanction associated with non-compliance (failure of systems) or 
of criminal proceedings in the event of breaking the law (failure to indentify 
laundering activity) or some combination of the two aimed at protecting the 
institution. It is interesting to note that as part of some earlier research with 
compliance officers undertaken by the first author, an attempt was made 
to interview one of the banks that had been fined for non-compliance to 
understand the potential impact on reputation. Whilst the particular Money 
Laundering Reporting Officer within this bank was willing to explore the 
impact on the bank of having been the subject of a fine it was disclosed that 
“one of the terms of the FSA enforcement notice was that we would not discuss the 
matter with any third party other than the FSA.” Thus the matter could not be 
pursued.17
 This perception is not limited to the broader financial sector. In this 
regard it is interesting to consider the comments made in an interview with 
an MLRO from the gaming sector that was conducted by the first author in 
June 2009:
17 E-mail exchange with deputy MLRO of a financial institution 16th June, 2004.
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“Risk to [name of company] of non-compliance is what drives the 
company to be compliant – otherwise we will lose our licence to operate. 
The driver is not to identify proceeds of crime but to be showing to be 
seen as compliant and diligent.”
 And:
“SARs is a small percentage of what we do – the focus is on processes and 
polices in place to prove against any challenge from the regulators”. . . . 
“Drive is integrity of the industry and reputation and integrity of the sport.”
Is it possible then that, mindful of the threat of regulatory censure for non-
compliance, the regulated sector will show their adherence to the rules and 
invest in appropriate systems in order to avoid the attention of either law 
enforcement or the regulatory agencies. Is there now a point of containment 
that has been reached where the regulated entities feel that they have 
shouldered a sufficient burden and the regulators recognise that they will be 
unable to extract anything further? An accepting and ‘comfortable’ symbiotic 
relationship in that each knows where they stand in relation to the other – 
much as our elderly married couple?
 It is interesting to also note the content of a document produced by the 
FSA in August 2009:“FSA Scale and Impact of Financial Crime Project”. The 
first part of this paper (published as Occasional Paper 3618) provides a review 
of the academic work in the field that has considered scale and measurement 
of financial crime. The second part of the document 19 looked not only at 
the impact of financial crimes but significantly at their amenability to control 
by the regulator. The opening paragraph in the section 4.3:“Amenability of 
money laundering to FSA control” includes a quotation from Levi:
“[I]t remains uncertain and seldom asked, whether or not it is harder to 
practise as an ‘organised criminal’, a fraudster or a terrorist now compared 
with 1988, when the UN Vienna Convention and the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision ushered in the Brave New World of seeking on 
a global basis to control the criminal money trail”.20
18 A copy of the report can be found at: http://hb.betterregulation.com/ external/
Occasional%20Paper%20OP%2036.pdf
19 A copy can be located at:
  http://www.caerdydd.ac.uk/socsi/resources/scale_and_impact_paper.pdf
20 Levi, M., “Pecunia non olet? The control of money-laundering revisited”. In 
Bovenkerk, F. and Levi, M. (eds) The Organised Crime Community: Essays in Honour of 
Alan A Block (studies in organised crime) vol. 6 (pp. 161-182), New York: Springer, 
2007
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Unfortunately the paper does not answer the question posed in the title 
but instead sets out the additional research that the authors argue should be 
undertaken with victims, launderers and risk professionals. It does note, however 
that “there is much scepticism in market circles over whether anti-money laundering 
measures have any deterrent effect on the volume of laundering overall” (p. 34).
Harmony: tension, dilemmas and cost avoidance
The FSA and the current FCA have interpreted the money laundering laws 
and associated regulations and defined them in a series of rules and compliance 
actions required by the regulated sector. There emerged an uneasy truce 
whereby those that are regulated give the appearance of maximum support 
and the perception of compliance with the money laundering regulations. 
Compliance mechanisms will be highly organised and well-composed, systems 
will be well documented; staff will be identifiable, and apparent controls 
will be in place. The overwhelming impression will be one of compliance 
and orderly conduct, regardless of whether any meaningful results are being 
achieved. Hence investment in systems and procedures is viewed as providing 
concrete evidence of an institution’s commitment to fulfilling obligations. 
The effect is that those firms who manifest these signs will be able to deflect 
any too critical attention of the regulators (Bosworth-Davies, 2009). What 
they achieve, however, is the evidence of being compliant without necessarily 
being effective, the ‘tick-box culture’ identified by Harvey (2005). 
 The role of compliance is a cost overhead and frequently viewed as 
business inhibiting by the revenue generating parts of their business. It 
therefore serves their purpose if those employed in compliance are able 
to ensure that they justify their own position and contribution to their 
employers. It is interesting to consider the comments of the interviewee 
from the accounting sector from 2009:
“There is a problem with resources for a firm this size – we ignore stuff 
and keep our fingers crossed. Small companies will have a manual and it 
will all be kept up to date. If you are larger you can afford some overhead 
staff . . . A lot of analysis is done because we have to do it but it is totally 
meaningless . . .”
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The MLRO from the financial institution interviewed in June 2009 noted:
“It is very hard to get costs. I used to do a lot with the BBA and they 
would always be moaning that nobody ever gives us these numbers apart 
from you can identify what you have brought and how much that costs, 
say £15 mill plus the staff support plus the team to run it – we’ve got 40 
staff. Looking at it from the firm’s view, from the law enforcement, from 
the FSA, constantly at us all the time have we got money laundering 
here? The fact that we haven’t is probably nothing to do with the money 
laundering controls in place. So yes cost is reasonable in some areas, not in 
others, but at the bottom of it all who is going to decide what the risk is?”
Harvey and Lau (2009) suggested that given the investment undertaken by 
the regulated institutions over the past decade or so they would rather not 
consider alternative approaches, indicating support for the maintenance of 
the status quo. This takes us into a difficult area because banks rationalise their 
investment costs on the basis of the harm that money laundering can do to 
the institution. There is now (Levi, 2007) a massive industry that has been 
spawned – accreditation, training, new areas of government and restructured 
law enforcement agencies.21 As a business cost it is in the interests of those 
within the compliance field to overstate importance and significance of the 
threat and justification for the expense incurred (Harvey, 2008; Alldridge, 
2008). We see exploitation of ‘fear’ and the availability heuristic (footnote 
10) to ensure greater resource allocation and status by the employees within 
the compliance function. 
 A further tension surrounds the quality of what is reported by the 
institutions to the police. Demetis and Angell (2007) draw attention to 
our innate desire to manage the unusual as, “by finding a way to represent 
risk our hopelessness with uncertainty is swapped for the optimism in a structured 
plan of action that is meant to handle the risk” (p. 413). Further, they go on 
to point out that the risk of the reporting regime is that reporting of the 
unusual generates a high degree of “false-positives” such that “Under the fear 
of regulatory enforcement, institutions reported excessively, and thereby uncertainty 
and thus risk were passed onto the FIU, whose staff could not be certain whether it 
was real suspicion being reported or a self-defensive act by the reporters” (p. 419). 
21 Indeed, a simple Google search for the phrase “AML due diligence” returned 751.000 
hits, primarily focuesed on how to ensure compliance (1st September 2014)
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From a different perspective but adding weight to the debate over quality of 
reporting from institution to police, consider the following statement:
“One of my main concerns is that so much of the approach used 
across banks is based on such limited empirical evidence. The main risk 
assessment inputs we use – country, product type, and customer business 
– are hard to assess objectively and I really wonder whether there is 
a significant correlation between customer AML risk ratings and actual 
money laundering.”22 
Conclusion: the interconnection and regulatory 
capture
The narrative of complexity and threat can serve well the agencies and indeed 
those involved in compliance. Dorn discusses ‘regulatory ineffectiveness’ (2009, p. 
12) pointing to evidence of regulatory capture whereby initially independent 
agencies become closely intertwined with those that they regulate, reflective 
of the tendency for collaboration and cooperation (and movement) between 
the two. The result was that rather than acting objectively in the public interest 
the regulators adopt the interests and objectives of those that they regulate 
seeing that they serve a joint purpose of mutual personal and institutional 
sustainability and support – back to our long suffering married couple! The 
regulator rather than being the objective arbiter of public interest, began to 
take decisions in the interests of the regulated sector. Van Duyne (2010, p 10) 
refers to this regulatory capture and to the evidence that “the regulatory bodies 
adapted their view to the interests of those they had to supervise . . .[with the result 
that] the supervisors and supervised adopted a similar way of (rosy) thinking.” Thus, 
the underlying legislation may not act as was originally intended (Cook, 
2006), particularly if not properly applied by the regulators. Indeed any 
external criticism of the sector that might challenge or undermine this status 
quo could be dismissed simply because those from outside would lack tacit 
knowledge and understanding of the internal workings of the financial sector. 
The MLRO from the financial sector interviewed in June 2009 commented 
in this regard: “There is a professionalisation of this as if you look at the obligations 
on the individual you all tend to huddle together”. Thus industry shibboleths are 
22 E-mail correspondence with the author from a compliance officer within a bank 
30th July 2008
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accepted as being truisms without underpinning evidence. It is inevitable 
that MLROs will repeat industry mantras without thought to their validity 
or having examined evidence to the contrary, being expected to know the 
proper response to questions or challenge. The power dynamics reinforce 
the status quo of the didactic rhetoric justifying the approach on grounds 
of complexity. It would appear that they are acting in an entirely rational 
way, exploiting any inherent advantage to justify their own existence. As 
such reality is re-framed such that, from their perspective, their activity and 
approach is entirely justified. Agency bias means that tensions will exist but 
having got to this point the rules of the relationship are accepted and as long 
as all play their allotted part, the status quo is maintained and the relationship 
continues in uneasy but tolerant harmony.
 Before closing it is perhaps interesting to add the following note taken from 
the first Anti-money Laundering Annual Report of the FCA23 that stated: 
“However, our risk-based supervisory techniques (set out in Section 
4) have led us to conclude that the level of anti-money laundering 
compliance in financial services firms is a serious concern”. (p. 11) 
 They go on to note:
“The root cause of these problems is often a failure in governance of 
money laundering risk, which leads, among other things, to inadequate 
anti-money laundering resources and a lack of (or poor quality) assurance 
work across the firm. This often focuses on whether processes have been 
followed rather than on the substance of whether good AML judgements 
are being made.” (p 12).
It is possible that the long standing relationship is finally at an end.
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